


A *Polit. Pamph. vol 73* 7

PROPOSAL

For putting a
Speedy End to the War,
By Ruining the COMMERCE of the
French and Spaniards,
And Securing our Own,
Without any additional Expence
to the Nation.



L O N D O N,
Printed for *Daniel Brown* at the Black Swan and
Bible without *Templebar*, and *Andrew Bell* at the
Crosskeys and Bible in *Cornhil*. MDCCIII,

PROPOSAL

For putting a
Speedy End to the War

By Raising the Consents of the
French and Spaniards,

And securing our Own

Without any additional Expence

to the Nation.



Printed for Daniel Brown at the Black Swan and
White without Temple, and Andrew Bell at the
Crown and Bible in Cornhill. MDCCLII.

To his Royal Highness

T H E

P R I N C E,

Lord High Admiral of *England.*

S I R,

THE following Proposal for the Securing of Commerce, could be nowhere so properly address'd as to your Royal Highness, who in your exalted Station can do nothing at present that will be more for the Security of these Kingdoms, or for your own Glory, than the protecting and maintaining our Trade. The French by their practice in the present War will shew, that it's their Opinion that they can do

nothing more fatal to these Nations, than the ruining their Traffick. For which reason I humbly conceive they will not pretend to engage us at Sea; but laying up their Capital Ships, will infest us with their Privateers, and their Cruisers. And indeed, why should they run the Risk of engaging us, when they can destroy us without it? For by ruining our Commerce, our Navigation sinks, our Seamen are lost, and our Royal Fleet in a very few Years must by consequence fall. The French therefore, with submission to your Royal Highness, will not pretend to engage us; for should they get the better of us, they have not leisure at the present juncture to invade us, and can reap no Advantage from their Victory, but what they may have in a great degree without it, and that is the destroying our Trade; which if they can promise themselves to do, they need not run the hazard at present of an Invasion, tho they had Leisure and Troops to attempt it; for from the destruction of our Traffick they may promise themselves all the Advantages which they could reap from an Invasion, without running the risk of it. And whereas an Invasion would be expensive, as well as hazardous, this other way will be gainful as well as certain; since the ruin of our Commerce will impoverish us, and
despirit

despirit us, and bringing us up tame to their hands, will conquer us without a Blow. For our Traffick by frequent Losses will be discourag'd and daily lessen'd, and the diminution of that will decrease our Manufactures; the decay of which will augment the Number of the Poor, make the Tenants less able to pay their Rents, and render the Taxes at length intolerable. Since therefore 'tis plain, that the only Design which the French have against us at present, is to ruin our Commerce, I leave it to be determin'd by your Royal Highness whether it ought not to be our chief care to destroy theirs and to preserve our own; which if we can effect, we may be sure of the Victory without running the venture for it, and barely supporting our Allies, and acting defensively on the Continent, may in a few Years see the numerous Armies of our Enemies consum'd and lost by Famine.

But that the Royal Navy of England alone is not sufficient to maintain our Trade, and to destroy theirs, is plain, because it never has done it. For since in the separate War which we formerly had with Spain, and in that which we lately had with France, our Losses by Sea were very grievous, notwithstanding our formidable Squadrons, and our numerous Cruisers, how should
those

those Squadrons and Cruisers prevent them in the War in which we are at present engag'd against those potent Kingdoms united? To prevent our Losses, and to augment theirs, I should be apt to believe requires an Additional and a Proportion'd Force. And I leave it to your Royal Highness to consider whether it is not reasonable, at the time we are making such vast preparations against their Grand Squadrons which will not appear to engage us, that some effectual Provision should be made against those Robbers which will certainly appear to plunder us. I thought it might be for the Service of the Queen and your Royal Highness, to offer you a Hint of such a Provision, by an additional and well-proportion'd Force. If that Hint is barely good, your Royal Highness will easily see that it is highly important: For if the French by means of their Privateers can so grievously endamage our Trade, at the very time that their Grand Fleet dares not shew it self on the Ocean; I leave it to your Royal Highness to consider what a terrible Ravage we must make in their Traffick, by employing such a subordinate Force as will be mention'd hereafter: By imploying such a Force, I say, at the same time that the Dutch and we with our Grand Squadrons, under the auspicious Conduct
of

of your Royal Highness, ride the unquestioned Masters of the Main.

If your Royal Highness approves of the following Hint, it can never enter into the Great Council by a more valuable Recommendation, as is plain to all the World by the extraordinary Testimony which they are giving of their Esteem for You: and the Esteem which those awful Assemblies have shewn for You, is a convincing proof that your Royal Highness, tho born a stranger to us, has not only liv'd for so many Years with an unblemish'd Character among a People who are generally thought to be averse to Strangers, but that the Reputation of your Virtue has gain'd the Affections of all Englishmen, even to the remotest parts of the Kingdom.

The protecting and maintaining our Commerce, will not fail to advance your Royal Highness's Interest, and to augment your Glory: For if such Cries, such Clamours, nay such Curses were utter'd against some Commissioners of the Admiralty in the late Reigns, for suffering by their Malice, or their Mismanagement, our trading Vessels to become a Prey to our Enemies; What numberless Blessings must be heap'd upon your Royal Highness, by a happy People flourishing in their Commerce under your auspicious Conduct?

To

To detain you no longer, I conclude with my zealous wishes for the Prosperity of the Queen and your Royal Highness. May she long reign in the Hearts of all her People, and You reign long in Hers; and while She with Mildness governs the Land, may your Highness with Terror controul the Main, and appear, to the Confusion of our Enemies, the dreadful Wonder of God in the Deep. May both the Queen and your Royal Highness find all her Subjects as strongly inclin'd, but much more able to serve you, than,

S I R,

Your Royal Highness's

most Humble,

most Dutiful, and

most Obedient Servant,

JOHN DENNIS.

Carleton, from which it is evident, that we run
a hazard at Land, whether we shall be victorious
or not; and we are, the same of several par-
ticulars may not conclude the War.

At Sea the case is vastly different for there
we need not run the risk of the Enemy, and
let us place our betters; this being a thing that
we will make an effort, we may be Masters of
the Sea.

PROPOSALS
*For putting a speedy End to the
War, &c.*

Now this is certain, That if we can continue
entirely Masters of the Sea, we shall put a stop

THAT it is the joint Interest of all the
Confederates to use their utmost Efforts
for the putting a speedy End to the
present War, is plain from hence, That
a Delay will probably be more favourable to the
French than it will be to us: For wherever there
is a War between a Confederate Power on the
one side, and an united Absolute one on the other,
Time (if there is any proportion of Strength
between them) must subject the Confederate to
more Contingencies than it can the Single Absolute
Power.

The making a very great Effort at Sea, will be
more effectual on our part towards the speedy end-
ing of the War, than the sending formidable For-
ces to *Flanders*, or any part of the Continent, be-
cause at Land we run a greater Risk, and the Gain
is not so significant.

The *French* have more numerous Armies than
we; and those Armies are very well disciplin'd;
and they have a great many more impregnable

Garisons. From which it is evident, that we run a Hazard at Land whether we shall be victorious or not; and if we are, the Gain of several Battels may not conclude the War.

At Sea the case is vastly different, for there we need run little or no risk of the Enemy, unless we please our selves; this being a thing that is never to be questioned. That if the *Dutch* and we will make an Effort, we may be Masters of the Sea.

Now this is certain, That if we can continue entirely Masters of the Sea, we must put a speedy End to the War; for our entire Command o'er the Seas must ruin our Enemys Commerce, and that utterly. Now Commerce is the only Fountain of Treasure in Countries that have no Mines; and Silver and Gold, are the only Sinews of War; which Sinews, when they happen to be cut off, or to be very much obstructed, the Body Politick becomes of a sudden either Maim'd, Impotent, or Paralytick.

But then this at the same time must be observ'd, That they only are entire Masters of the Sea who can command it absolutely; and they alone can be said to command it absolutely, who make their Maritime Power answer all the Ends for which it was designed; and these are the Defence of their Coasts, the Security of their own Commerce, and the Ruin of that of their Enemies.

From which it is plain, that our present Maritime Forces are insufficient to render us entirely Masters of the Seas; for being unable to protect

us from the *French Privateers*, they cannot secure our Commerce. But that they are unable to protect us from the *French Privateers*, is evident, not only from Matter of Fact, and the vast number of Vessels that we lost in the late War, notwithstanding that we had above one hundred Men of War equipp'd on our own part, but from the nature of the thing it self: for the *French Privateers* being so much smaller, and lighter, at least for the generality, than our Ships of War which cruize upon them, are consequently so much swifter; and not drawing half the Quantity of Water which the Cruizers draw, are by that means enabled to escape from them in shole Water, besides that our Fleet of War is obliged for the most part to act united.

But if it is impossible to secure our own Commerce with our present Maritime Power, it is by consequence impossible to ruin that of the Enemy; for their Robberies upon the Seas are equivalent to them (at least in some measure) to Commerce: For by means of the aforesaid Robberies they import those Commodities into *France*, for which their Enemies trade for nothing; besides that by this method they supply themselves with Ships. So that our present Maritime Power being insufficient to ruin the Enemies Commerce utterly, and by that means to enervate the Sinews of War, is by consequence insufficient to put a speedy End to that War.

But that it is in our Power, with an additional Maritime Force, to secure our Commerce and ruin that of the Enemies, and so to become intirely Mas-

ters of the Seas, may (I believe) appear from hence, that having more Ships of every Burden, and more Seamen than the *French*, we are as able to make an effectual Provision against their Pirates and Robbers, as against their Fleet of War; by which we at once secure our Trade, and ruin that of our Enemies, nay, and ruin it in all the Branches of it; not only cutting off their Correspondence between the *West-Indies* and *Europe*, but that which they also at present maintain between one part of *Europe* and another.

To shew how this may brought to pass, is the end of the ensuing Lines: In order to the doing which, I shall treat of the following Points.

First, I shall shew, what Number of Ships, of what Bigness, and how Armed, must be provided for the compassing this Design.

Secondly, I shall enquire into the Expence of setting them forth.

Thirdly, I shall discover a Method to defray that Expence, without taxing the People.

Fourthly, I shall shew how these Ships are to be used and dispos'd.

Fifthly, I shall shew the Advantage which may be reap'd from them.

Sixthly, I shall answer some Objections.

First

First then, Besides the Grand Royal Fleet, which in conjunction with the *Dutch*, we suppose to be more than an equal Match for the whole *French* Royal Navy ; not only in the *Channel*, but in the *Straits* too, and the *West-Indies*, according to the several Squadrons : We next suppose a subordinate Fleet to be equipp'd, which for the most part is to act distinctly from the other, and to consist of two hundred Vessels *English*, and two hundred *Dutch*, the best Sailers that the Queen and the States can light of, all of them containing one with another two hundred Tuns a Vessel ; the whole to be arm'd with ten thousand *English*, and ten thousand *Dutch*, who are to be a fifth part Mariners, and the rest Marines. The Number of Guns in every Vessel to be proportioned to the bigness of the Vessel, and the Number of the Men. The Captain of every Vessel to have the Queen's and the State's Commissions, by which they are to be authoriz'd to scowr the Seas of Privateers and Pirats : But they who have the Queen's Commissions, are not like the Vessels of the great Fleet to carry the Royal Flag, because in case of a manifest Disadvantage they are to be allowed to run, which the Honour of *England* will not allow to the Flag.

I come now to say something of the Expence of Equipping this Fleet ; and without pretending to an exact Calculation, I shall content my self with coming something near to it. Let us allow then 200000 *l.* per *Annum* for the Hire of the Ships for
our.

our part of the Expence, and as much for the *Dutch*; and 300000 *l.* *per annum* for us, and as much for the *Dutch*, for the Wages of the Men, their Provision and Ammunition: and having done that, let us proceed to the Method of defraying so considerable a Charge.

Nothing can be more natural than to conclude, that since this additional Expence is originally and immediately employ'd for the defence of the Merchants, that they should be oblig'd to defray it, who principally derive their Security from it. 'Tis true, the whole Nation will share in the Defence which they will receive from it; but the Merchants will have the principal Share in the Gain, of which it is but reasonable that they should contribute a part to support it, especially since they will derive the Security of their Gain from that very Contribution. Let us suppose then, that every one should be oblig'd to ensure at the rate of 5 *l.* *per Cent.* Exports, and 10 *l.* *per Cent.* Imports, (take one Place with another) and that this Insurance Mony, according to the value of Imports and Exports, as they have been valued by late Computations, the Imports at between seven and eight Millions, and the Exports at between four and five, will amount to a Million of *Sterling* Mony. So that 500000 *l.* being allow'd on our part, and as much on that of the *Dutch* for the Hire of the Ships, the Wages of the Men, their Ammunition and Provision, there remains 500000 *l.* to us, and 500000 *l.* to the *Dutch*, to make good the Losses.

But

But now as every Merchant is oblig'd to ensure, the Queen is suppos'd to become the General Ensurer for us, and the States for the *Dutch*: And this Ensurance Mony is to be paid down at the Custom-House, at the same time with the Customs, to prevent a new Creation of Officers, which may be troublesome and expensive. But one thing I forgot to add, That tho the Queen is suppos'd to be General Ensurer, yet she is always to except the Danger of the Sea it self, for Reasons so obvious, that they are needless to be insisted on here, and is only to ensure the Merchants against all Captures; and that the other Ensurance against the Danger of the Seas, may be practis'd by those who undertake it in time of Peace. But then in case it would be more for the Queen's Convenience, that some of the Ensurance Mony for the Imports should be paid at the respective Foreign Ports from which the Ships set forth, because this Method in some places, particularly in the *Straits*, and the *West-Indies*, may save the Queen the trouble and charge, and delay of Remittances in that case; it may be provided that the Mony be paid to the Queen's Governor, or Consul residing at or near the respective Ports; and that Debentures may be given by the aforesaid Governors or Consuls, to the Value of each Receipt.

I come to shew how this subordinate Fleet may be employ'd and dispos'd for the Service of the Nation.

I suppose then that 30 of them should be always cruising in the Seas between *England* and *Holland*; twenty between *Ostend* and *Calais*, which takes in *Dunkirk*; five betwen *Calais* and *Haver de Grace*; five between *Haver de Grace* and *La Hogue*; before *St. Malo* twenty; in the Chops of the Channel and the *Irish* Seas forty; South-West of *Ireland* twenty; *Bay of Biscay* thirty; Coasts of *Spain* in the Ocean thirty; which Numbers computed make two hundred in all. The remaining two hundred are to be thus employ'd; An hundred of them are to accompany the Royal Squadron to the *Straits*, there to separate from, and to act distinctly (unless necessity require otherwise) and fifty to cruize in the *Mediterranean*; thirty in the *Gulf of Venice*, and twenty in the *Archipelago*. The remaining hundred to be thus dispos'd of; Threescore and ten of them to be sent to the *West-Indies*, fifty of them to act on the Coasts of the *Spanish-Indies*, in conjunction with the *Buccaneers*; and the other twenty on the Coasts of *New-England* and *New-York*; and the remaining thirty are to be sent to the Coasts of *Guinea* and *Gambo*.

Let us now say a word concerning the Advantage which we should receive from employing so numerous a Force in the foremention'd manner.

First, We shall by this means effectually secure our Commerce; for if during the late War, we did not lose above one Ship in four, in the time of the greatest Mismanagement,

ment, it is very probable we shall not lose above one in twenty now.

If there should be no mismanagement in the present War, yet our Grand Fleet would never be able wholly to secure our Commerce; for the *French* Privateers would be too nimble for our Men of War, and our own Privateers (if we should set out any) would scarce ever attack those of the Enemy; but it would be the main part of the business of this subordinate Fleet to attack the *French* Privateers, and if it were supported and sustained by our Cruizers, we have no reason to doubt, but that in a very little time it would be able to clear the Seas of them; so that by this Method, in all probability, we should save the Nation those vast Sums, which our Losses would otherwise amount to. Besides, as by this means we should secure our Commerce, we should expedite Trade, and by dispatching it, in some measure double it, because none of our trading Vessels would be oblig'd to stay for Convoys.

Secondly, As by this means we should secure our own Commerce, we should ruin that of the *French*; and I leave it to any one to judg, Whether fifty of these Ships in the *West-Indies*, acting in concert with the Buccaneers, and distinctly from our Royal Squadron (unless there should prove at any time a necessity for their acting jointly) would not cut off all manner of Intercourse between *France*, *Spain*, and the *West-Indies*, and hinder the Importation of Bullion, and the Passage of their Plate Fleets? by which alone they

C

can

can pretend to be formidable : And whether it would not prove the most effectual Method for the seizing upon several Places there, which at the end of the War remaining our own by Treaty, would serve to defray the Charges of it ? Besides, I leave it to any to consider, whether the Royal Squadron to be sent to the *West-Indies*, acting (as it might do) upon an Emergency in concert with this additional Force, might not seize upon the most important Places which the *Spaniards* hold in those Parts ?

By the Squadron of these subordinate Ships, which we should have in the *Straits* (distinctly by our Men of War) the *Dutch* and We should be enabled to secure the *Turky* Trade to our selves ; we should, as it were, invest the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, and be instrumental in reducing them to the Emperor's Party ; raise the Credit of the Emperor with the Port, and sink the Reputation of the *French* ; prey on both sides the Ecclesiastical State, not only upon the *Mediterranean* Coasts adjacent to *Ostia* and *Civita Vecchia*, but likewise upon the *Adriatick* Shore, adjoining to *Cesennate*, *Pesaro*, *Ravenna*, *Ancona*, *Rimini*, &c. encourage the *Venetians* to declare for the right Side, and be a terrible Awe upon the rest of the *Italian* Princes. This Squadron cruizing in the *Mediterranean*, whilst the Royal Squadron observ'd the *French*, would lamentably harass the *Spanish* Coasts, and utterly intercept their Trade, while that in the Ocean would hinder the Inter-course between *France* and *Spain*, and be a severe Bridle upon the *Portuguese*.

To

To come nearer home, the *French* would have no Correspondence by Sea between one part of *France* and another. Their Coasters in all likelihood would be a perpetual Prey to us: Nothing could be transported from *Dunkirk* to *Brest*, or from *Brest* to *Dunkirk*, unless it should be by Land-Carriage, which would put the *French* King to a prodigious Expence; besides, we should hinder their Traffick to *Denmark* and *Sweden*, and *Hamborough*, and the rest of the Northern Ports, from which they have not only their Naval Stores, but their best Timber.

Besides all this, we should secure our *Newcastle* Trade, and so provide in some measure for the Relief of the Poor, and defend and support the Fishery both of *England* and *Holland*, intercept the Commerce of our Enemies here, and of those in *France*; interrupt the nightly Traffick of our Owlers, which is so prejudicial to the Woollen Manufacture, and prevent and obstruct all manner of Smugling and running of Goods, and so advance the Customs; sustain the Commerce of our Western Ports, which in the late War were ruin'd, either for want of Convoys, or by too high an Insurance. All this we might do by this additional Force rightly manag'd, and according to the Necessity of Time and Place supported and back'd by our Cruizers. Besides, these subordinate Vessels repairing to our Coasts upon any Necessity, as to *Deal*, *Sandwich*, or the like, while Winter constrains our great Ships to keep the Harbour, might prove an admirable Outwork to our Royal Navy, which is the natural Bulwark of *England*.

Moreover, they might be serviceable in transporting our Soldiers to any of the Coasts of *France*, or be made instrumental in bombarding any of their Ports; and the Marines by frequent Descents might continually spoil their Coasts.

To all this I might add, that by employing the Marines designed for this Subordinate Fleet, we should establish a numerous Nursery of Seamen; who as soon as the War is over, may be made use of in recovering the Fishery of *Greenland* and *Newfound-land*, and restoring the Northern Fishery.

I come now to answer Objections, which are chiefly Five. The

First is, That the Merchants would think this a hardship upon them.

The Second, That the *Dutch* would not comply with it.

The Third, That the *French* Privateers would out-number, and consequently over-pow'r them.

The Fourth, That the Money set apart for the making good the Losses, might prove insufficient, and so bring the Nation more into Debt.

The Fifth, That this would be a needless Preparation, because our own Privateers encourag'd, would answer the end.

First, That the Merchants would think this a Hardship upon them. To which I answer, That this way of proceeding would make the Merchants Gain more certain, tho it might not make it so great. If the Pressure upon them were to be into-

intolerable, nay very grievous or perpetual, we might be inclin'd to bear with their Complaints, and to indulge the Frailties of Human Nature: But since they are to be but slight, we must beg leave to tell them, that at a time when their Religion, their Liberty, nay the whole of that very Property, for a trifling part of which they appear so much concern'd, is at stake, they shew themselves unreasonable to set an inconsiderable Overplus of sordid Gain in the Balance against all this; nay, they proceed contrary to the Maxims by which they are guided even in their own Commerce; for they make nothing of hazarding five hundred Pounds, that they may draw a thousand home from the *Indies*. How then can they reasonably murmur at the paying a small Sum to the Queen, which will not much burden them, for the Security of all which they are to trade during the War, and all they inherited or acquired before, especially since this is a Maxim among them, *that what is sav'd, is got?* But they are but a Part of that great Body, the *People*, and they ought not to repine at any little Inconvenience, if it tends to the Defence of the *Whole*; because the *whole* can never be ruin'd, but the Parts too must be destroy'd. If there remain any few among them, who are so unreasonable as not to be satisfy'd with what has been said, they are desir'd to consider, that they are but a Part of the whole Body of the Merchants, and it is unreasonable in them to repine at what the State thinks necessary for the Defence of themselves and their Brethren, and the common Security of Trade. But to make this Un-
 reaso-

reasonableness appear still greater, I shall consider
 them in their different Capacity, for all the Mer-
 chants by the present War are reduced under one
 of these three Heads; They who are Insurers;
 They who Indure; Or they who run the Ven-
 ture. They who are Insurers, will infallibly op-
 pose this Design, because it will oppose their
 Gain. But the unreasonableness of these People
 will appear from hence, that they have a mind to
 be the only Gainers by what the Publick does for
 the Security of Trade; for even in the condition
 in which things are at present, those Ships which
 will be preserved, must be protected by our Men
 of War, and therefore I think it very unreasona-
 ble that the Government should bear the Charge
 of sending out Convoys to protect the Merchants,
 and that the *Jews* (for such in the late War were
 most of the Insurers) should be paid for it; for I
 hope no one believes that they can contribute any
 thing to the Security of any one Ship for which
 they may underwrite. But their Unreasonableness
 may appear yet further from this, That these Peo-
 ple are for hazarding the Publick in hope of their
 private Gain. In our late War, several of our
 most considerable Merchants left off their Trade
 to turn Insurers, I mean, either left it wholly off,
 or in a great part; by which there followed two
 Inconveniences to the Publick: for, first, the Ex-
 tent of the Trade was reduc'd to a narrow com-
 pass; and, secondly, the King's Customs were
 considerably less'n'd. And will these Men have
 the face to tell the Government that they ought

to reject the present Design, because their embracing it would infallibly put these People out of capacity of doing the Publick the same Mischief again?

But now let us come to those who in case of a War are resolv'd to Insure: And for these Gentlemen I desire only in short to ask them two or three Questions. First, Whether they had rather the Queen and the Publick should get that Mony which they are resolv'd to part with for their private Security, or a few private Persons who have no relation at all to, and perhaps are mere strangers to them? Secondly, Whether they had rather part with their Mony to those who can secure them, or who cannot? The Government is solvable in case of Loss, whereas private Men often fail; no sort of People in the late War being more known to break, than the Body of Insurers. But supposing they do not, private Men at the best can secure but the prime Cost, supposing the Dealing to be direct and fair between them; nor even the whole prime Cost, because the Insurers pay but seventy five or eighty Pounds for a hundred; whereas the Government not only secures the prime Cost, and the whole prime Cost, but by scowring the Seas, according to the scope of the present Design, secures their Gain too in a very great degree, and by so doing confirms it self, which is a double Security to them: for they would have little cause to boast of their Gain, if after having thriven in their private Capacity, they should be undone at last with the Publick. They ought to consider then,
that

that by Insuring with private Persons, they make no provision at all for the Publick, with which they must stand or fall; and a very invalid one in the mean while for themselves, because private Persons who appear to be the most considerable, are often seen to be utterly undone in a moment. Whereas by paying this Insurance-Money to the Publick, they make an effectual Provision for that, and a valid Security for themselves; because, by proceeding thus, they are certain not to fall, unless the Government falls with them, without which they cannot stand. In short, I desire to ask these Gentlemen, Whether since the Loss of every Man, who lives under the Protection of the Government, is a Loss to the Publick, which no private Insurer ever did, or can pretend to make good, it is not very reasonable, nay very natural, that the Publick should be enabled to provide effectually against it?

But now let us come to the Merchant-Adventurer, who neither underwrites, nor insures, but is resolv'd to run the Risk. He is in a wealthy and sanguine Condition, both his Veins and his Coffers are full, and consequently he is enclined to hope the best; and he is willing to venture, because if he succeeds, his Gain will be more considerable: 'Tis true, but then so will his Loss provided he does not succeed. But Fortune, he says, has been favourable to him hitherto, and why should he doubt of her being so for the future? Why, for that very reason, because she has been favourable hitherto; and the Reason is good, considering her usual Inconstancy. He would be a foolish Gamester

ster that should be confident of his winning in the latter part of the Night, because he had Luck in the former. Well, but if he has a Loss, he is very well able to bear it ; but then he is a great deal better able to bear the Insurance Mony, and therefore ought the less to repine at it : For since whatever he loses is so much Loss to the Publick, because every Man's single Property is infallibly part of the National Stock, I believe it will be found but reasonable, that what he gets should likewise be a Gain to the Publick. But that he who is able to bear a Loss, is better able to bear the Insurance, is plain from hence, That during the time of the late War, when the Privateers made most havock, there was about one Ship lost in four, so that but three parts in four, both of the Imports and Exports, went and came safe ; whereas the Insurance will not amount to above a sixth part of each. Considering that in the present War, our Enemies will be more numerous, and our Ports abroad fewer : we have no reason to believe that our Losses will be fewer, unless we take effectual and timely care, so that our Adventurer may very well lose one Ship in three ; and if Fortune should prove severe to him, one in two. Since therefore he cannot foresee the future, is it not a most unreasonable thing in him to murmur against a Design which will most probably be advantageous to him, and may possibly save him from ruin ? So that being unable to authorize his Complaint by Reason, he has nothing left to justify it but his Fancy : And what a pleasant Person must he be, who sets so senseless a thing as his Humor in ballance against

D

the

the common Security of Traffick, and the Safety of his Country?

But now I come to the next Objection, which is, That the *Dutch* will not fall in with a Design which is concerted here. In answer to which I shall only take notice, that the *Dutch* are as immediately concern'd (and perhaps more immediately) to put an end to the present War, than we; for if the War should be protracted 7, or 8, or 10 Years like the last, several destructive Accidents might very well happen in that space, which would not probably happen in 3 Years. The Queen (whom God long preserve) may die, so may the Emperor, so may the King of the *Romans*; these things in seven or eight, or ten Years, may fall out, considering the common condition of Mortality, and the Machinations of our Enemies: And in that case, considering the present Confusions of *England*, and the Distractions of the *Empire*, what would become of the Liberties of *Europe*, and of *Holland* particularly? Well then, the *Dutch* are concern'd as immediately, or rather more immediately than we to put a speedy end to the War: Now nothing can put a speedy end to the War, but the entirely ruining the Commerce of the Enemy, and the securing our own; and the doing this, in three Years time, would either bring down the *French* to our own Terms, or reduce them to so poor a condition, that if any of these fatal Accidents should happen, they would not be able to make their Advantage of them, but like an old Greyhound upon too hot a Course, they would be

be forc'd to lie down, and only pant and blow up on the Prey, which they would not be able to touch. Whether the Expedient above propos'd is sufficient to the compassing this Design, I leave to be determin'd by the Impartial Reader: But if this Expedient is sufficient for the ruining the *French* Commerce, and the securing our own, why then the *Dutch* would act most unreasonably, if at a time when we so chearfully contribute, beyond what we are obliged to by antient Treaties, to their Support and Assistance by Land, where their Danger is so much greater, and so much nearer than ours; they should refuse to contribute their part to our common Support at Sea, where our Concern is equal.

But if it be objected, that most of the Forces aboard these Subordinate Vessels, being to consist of Landmen, it would be unreasonable to expect that the *Dutch* should send Land-Forces to Sea, at the very time that they borrow of their Neighbours to defend their Frontiers: To that we answer, that we may raise Landmen for the *Dutch*, and the *Dutch* in return supply us with Seamen.

Supposing then that the *Dutch* will join with us, I shall proceed to the next Objection, which is, that the *French* and *Spanish* Privateers will outnumber the foresaid Vessels, and consequently overpower them. In order to the answering this, I desire leave to take notice of the most remarkable Differences in the Constitution (if I may so call it) of the *French* Privateers, and the abovementioned Vessels, and then to observe what Influence

those Differences must necessarily have on their Action, and on their Conduct.

First then, The Privateers fight only for their own Interest, whereas the forefald Vessels are suppos'd to fight for their Countries Interest and their own.

Secondly, The Privateers fight for the most part upon this Condition, to have no Purchase, no Pay; whereas the others are to be in constant Pay from the Queen.

Thirdly, The Privateers have no other incitement, than the hopes of immediate Gain, whereas the others will have that, and the Spur of Honour and Ambition besides; for if they do well in the Queen's Service, they may expect Advancement from Her. From which differences in their Constitution, there would follow these considerable ones in their Conduct: The Privateers being govern'd each within it self, and each of them absolutely independent of others, would act for the most part singly; for acting in Concert can hardly answer their End, which is, to enrich themselves; for they can scarce get so many together as to be potent enough for a trading Fleet and its Convoy, and they could never find their Account while they were altogether employ'd in taking of single Ships: But while they act singly, or by two or three in a company, the foremention'd Vessels would act in concert, always within call one of another, as having their General and Subaltern Officers like a Royal Navy; for which reason the Privateers would seldom or never have any Advantage over them, and they would never attack them without
such

such an Advantage, because Gain being their only Incitement, they would hardly be induced to fight when there was a great deal more danger of losing their own Ships, than of taking their Enemies; whereas our Ships acting in concert, and upon occasion in considerable numbers, would very often have the advantage of the Privateers; and when they had not, would be oblig'd by honour to attack them on the square; and whereas they who did so, would have both Ambition and Interest to sustain them, the others would have only mere private Interest. 'Tis true indeed, the number of Privateers may be something augmented by the D. of Anjou's accession to the Crown of Spain; but it will not be much, because the Spaniards have neither much Money, nor many Seamen to spare: And if sometimes our Cruizers alone, during the time of the late War, made such terrible work with the French Privateers, and would have made more if they had not been too nimble and too light for them; What must not so considerable, and so well proportion'd a Force do, back'd by those very Cruizers? How would those Privateers get out of St. Malo, or Dunkirk? or how would they get in again with their Plunder, when those Ports should be block'd up by our foresaid Vessels, sustain'd by our Fourth-rate Cruizers? Or would they not be afraid to venture when the Hazard is so great, and the Gain so uncertain? and when in open Sea, it would be difficult for them to distinguish our trading Ships from the very Vessels that would lie in wait for their Ruin. But if it should be urg'd that the French King in a very little time would be
for

for using the same Method, and send out his Privateers on his own account, back'd by some of his Men of War, in Numbers and Strength sufficient to resist ours: To that we answer, that he can never find Seamen enough to supply both his Navy, and those smaller Vessels; and that if he could, this Method would infallibly bring on a Sea-fight, which is the very thing that we chiefly ought to desire.

I come now to answer another Objection, which is, That the Mony set apart for making the Losses good, would be insufficient, and that consequently this Design would bring the Nation more into debt. But by what has been said already, and by what shall be now said, I doubt not of making it appear, that it would be an infallible Means for the keeping the Nation out of Debt. For, first, we have shewn in the preceding Paragraph, that the *French* would not be likely to take many of our Ships, and consequently this Method by saving the Ships, would preserve the Customs, and so prove a considerable Support to one of the greatest Branches of the Publick Revenue. But, secondly, since this Method will hinder them from taking our Ships; we must take theirs if they stir, and consequently there would be more Mony coming to the Queen, as well as to the Seamen to encourage them: Besides, that several of the Ships which we take from them might be imploy'd in the room of as many of the hir'd ones, and so lessen the Charge of the Undertaking. But if on the other side their Ships should not stir out, we should

should do our Business without taking them, for they cannot subsist without Commerce. Thirdly, The Money coming in daily at the Custom-houses for Insurance, may save the Government the borrowing of several Sums, and consequently save the Nation a great deal in extravagant Interest. Fourthly, The Money that may be paid for Importations at the Out-ports, and particularly at *Jamaica* and *Barbadoes*, may save the Queen a great deal of Charge, as well as Trouble and Time in Remittances thither. Fifthly, The prosecution of this Method will capacitate us the sooner to make an end of the War, and consequently enable us the sooner to get out of Debt, and so may save us vast Sums in Interest and in Principal.

There remains yet one more Objection, and that is, That this would be a needless Preparation, because our Privateers encourag'd, would answer all the Ends of it. To which I reply, That, first, the whole Number of Privateers would not amount to half the Force. Secondly, That that Number which should be equipp'd of them, would not act in concert. Thirdly, That in Privateers the Seamen would not have half the Incouragement that they will have in this Subordinate Fleet: For we suppose, that besides the ordinary Premiums upon Guns, such a Proportion of the Prizes as shall be thought convenient, shall still be allow'd to the Officers and the Seamen. Fourthly, Our ordinary Privateers would rarely attack those of the Enemy. Fifthly, The Gain to the Publick from Privateers would not be so much by a Tenth Part.

Sixthly,

Sixthly, It would be a hard matter to encourage Privateers, without burdening the Publick, because the *French* are a People of small Traffick, and others for the most part carry out their Goods for them.

Thus I have laid down the Method which came into my Thoughts for the securing of Commerce, and which the Sense of the Duty that I owe my Country, oblig'd me to propose to the Great Assembly which is chosen to represent it at this important Juncture. Whether the Method that I have propos'd be sufficient to answer the End, I leave to be determin'd by that Illustrious Assembly. If it appears to be effectual, I make no doubt but it will be follow'd; for then, tho we may be victorious without it, yet we may not: but the securing our Commerce will secure our Victory; and the Representatives of a Great and a Wise People will, if they can help it, leave nothing to Fortune. If we can secure our Commerce, we must remain a free Independent People; if we cannot, we may become a conquer'd Province.

F I N I S.

